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Abstract 
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti represents what Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine refers to as an 
event leading to the exploitation of disaster-shocked countries. With this idea in mind, this paper 
seeks to analyze the hidden setbacks of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 
and their counterproductive relationship with Haiti's unstable government in the aftermath of the 
2010 earthquake. The ways in which corruption operates within the Haitian government and 
international NGO structures pre-and post-neoliberalism, is an important factor in understanding 
this post-disaster relationship. Before neoliberalist ideologist expanded throughout the world, 
corruption in Haiti was evident under the Duvalier regime and the Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the 
presidency. Under neoliberalism, corruption continued within the Haitian government but also 
resulted in the rise of Western free-market policies as well as international NGOs. This, in turn, 
exacerbated the political, social, and economic instability of Haiti. Essentially, the argument of 
this paper is that the systemic corruption within the Haitian government resulted in a lack of 
regulation of international NGOs during their post-disaster response. This increased corruption 
and a lack of accountability within NGO’s resulted in a lack of progress in the aftermath of the 
2010 earthquake.
 Brun 4 
Good Governance and Governmentality in the Context of Development 
In the context of international development, the discourse surrounding Haiti’s political 
instability is mostly associated with a lack of good governance and its status as a failed state. In 
development, good governance is defined as the process in which public institutions conduct 
public affairs and manage public resources.1 Governance is the process of decision-making and 
the process in which decisions are implemented or not. Additionally, the characteristics that 
make up good governance include participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, 
consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and orientation, accountability, and strategic vision.2 
The concept of good governance emerged out of the notion of governmentality. 
Governmentality is a term created by philosopher Michel Foucault and refers to the way in 
which the state exercises control over, or governs, its population. Governmentality can also be 
understood as the "conduct of conduct”, referring to a government’s attempt to shape human 
conducted through calculated means.3 The main purpose of a government is to ensure the welfare 
of its citizens, and to promotes its longevity and wealth.  However, in Foucault's description of 
how a government is conducted, it is not always possible to coerce and regulate every 
individual’s actions. Therefore, governments operate by educating desires, aspirations, and 
beliefs of various stakeholders.4  
                                                 
1 Smith, T. (1979). The underdevelopment of development literature: the case of dependency 
theory. World Politics, 31(2), 247-288. 
2 ibid 
3 Li, T. (2007). Governmentality. Anthropologica, 49(2), 275-281. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25605363 
 
4 ibid 
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The will to govern and more importantly prioritize the welfare of a population is an 
integral part discussed in governmentality literature. In Foucault’s definition, it is defined as 
“men and their relations with wealth resources, means of subsistence, and territory”. The 
government then intervenes to foster beneficial processes that can increase the welfare of a 
population. Improving the welfare of a population requires what Foucault describes as 
governmental rationality, where a government follows the right way of doing things—good 
governance.5 This utopian element of good governance emphasizes a need for calculated 
strategies that will lead to the effective growth of a state. The most important key in 
governmentality is the will to govern. In the context of Haiti, the will to govern is overshadowed 
by the systemic corruption with the nation's government structures.  
 Although the concept of good governance is often equated to how a government 
functions, it also pertains to the effectiveness of relationships governments have with external 
actors. Good governance also focuses on how governments and other social organizations 
interact, how they relate to citizens, and how they go about making certain decisions.6 The 
attention is often focused on the governance framework in which good governance operates. The 
process includes the arrangements, procedures, and policies that define who gets power. 
Furthermore, the concept of good governance is applied in the global, national, institutional, and 
community context. Understanding governance at these various levels is made easier once the 
different entities that occupy the social and political spheres are considered. 
                                                 
5 Li, T. (2007). Governmentality. Anthropologica, 49(2), 275-281. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25605363 
 
6 Graham, J., Plumptre, T. W., & Amos, B. (2003). Principles for good governance in the 21st 
century. Ottawa: Institute on governance. 
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Within good governance literature, there is also the connection between political 
corruption and the lack of good governance. Although the literature focuses on the aspect of 
corruption in Nigeria, much of this argument holds true for Haiti where bribes, patronage, and 
nepotism are embedded within government structures. Other characteristics of good governance 
include voice and accountability, which refers to the capacity to call officials to account for their 
actions.7 In theory, good governance is supposed to lead to political stability and an absence of 
violence. If violence did not exist, this would then refer to the strength and expertise of 
bureaucracy structures to perform independently of political influence—and without drastic 
changes in policy. 
 Stability and effectiveness may show the responsiveness of a government to its people. 
There is also the aspect of regulatory quality which involves the perceptions of a government’s 
ability to adopt and implement policies that enhance private sector development. The rule of law 
is also as an essential part of good governance, and assesses the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system within a given state.8 This aspect is important, particularly when discussing the laws 
on human rights. For many underdeveloped countries that lack good governance, human rights 
violations are more likely to occur. Without political stability, there is no accountability or 
responsiveness from a leader.  
Given the various arguments about governance, the question then becomes can good 
governance equate to economic development, or in Haiti’s case, post-earthquake reconstruction. 
                                                 
7 Fagbadebo, O. (2007). Corruption, governance and political instability in Nigeria. African 
Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 1(2), 28. 
 
 
8 ibid 
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From an economist perspective, good governance is a prerequisite for economic growth. If all 
aspects of a country’s government strive for transparent, equitable, and market-driven policies 
then the overall development of a given country will prosper.9 The problem with 
"good governance" is that it makes perfect sense theoretically, but the implementation of this 
concept comes across various obstacles. For many developing countries such as Haiti, their 
instability is tied to the role colonialism played in disrupting their systems of living rather than 
the idea of "good governance" alone. 
Post-disaster Reconstruction in a Failed State 
 
Developing countries with the inability to achieve good governance are categorized as a 
failed state. The internal dynamics of failed states are unstable and the notion of government 
rationality is limited. Governments of failed states often cannot provide increase welfare 
resources, and economic stability for their citizens and have little or no control over their 
governance structures and policy outcomes. In some cases, these governments do not have 
enough ruling power to carry out functions that resemble good governance. In other cases, 
governments of failed states have a lack of political will to accept the responsibilities that come 
with their power. 
A failed state is defined as, “the product of a collapse of power structures providing 
political support for law and order, a process generally triggered and accompanied by “anarchic” 
forms of internal violence”.10 The era of warlords in Somalia in 1990; small-scale conflicts in 
                                                 
9 (Abdellatif, A. M. (2003, May). Good governance and its relationship to democracy and 
economic development. In Global Forum III on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity, 
Seoul (Vol. 20, p. 31). 
 
10Thürer, D. (1999). The “failed state” and international law. International Review of the Red 
Cross, 81(836), 731-761. 
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Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s are examples of failed 
states.  In these countries, law and order have collapsed under the pressure and amidst erupting 
violence. This example further links a lack of good governance to a characteristic of a failed 
state. The literature on failed states argue that “failed states” as an expression is not sufficiently 
precise. The word “failed” is seen as too broad of a term considering the fact that totalitarian 
states would equally be regarded as having “failed”—this is according to modern day 
international law. On the other hand, the “state without government” is too narrow, since other 
functions in addition to the central government of a state also collapse.11  
In the context of development, the more stable governments are understood to be the 
“First World”, while failed states exist in the less powerful “Third world”. The First World” 
consists of Western hegemonic powers such as the U.S. and European countries that maintain 
control of the globalized economic world.  Additionally, the extension of capitalism to the “Third 
World” gave way for hegemonic powers to rise and maintain economic control within “Third 
World” countries. The dependency theory also explains this unequal balance of power within the 
globalized system whereby, economic aid distributed by neoliberal institutions International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank was a strategy to further exploit the “Third World”.12 
Inequality is an outcome of the distribution of power that affects all populations in both worlds in 
the form of poverty, hunger, and lack of education. However, the expansion of capitalism has 
open countries in the "Third World" to economic exploitation that perpetuates such inequalities. 
                                                 
 
 
11 Thürer, D. (1999). The “failed state” and international law. International Review of the Red 
Cross, 81(836), 731-761. 
 
12 Smith, T. (1979). The underdevelopment of development literature: the case of dependency 
theory. World Politics, 31(2), 247-288. 
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Haiti and Corruption 
 
Located on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, Haiti gained its independence from 
France on January 1st, 1804.13 As a French colony, Haiti was one of the richest with its main 
exports of sugar, coffee, and cotton.14 Under these exports and slave labor, the economic state of 
Haiti during colonization was thriving. The successful slave revolt that soon followed, although 
it liberated the people, it also left Haiti’s economy in ruins. The leadership of the new nation was 
left to revive what was left of the economy and ensure the economic development and the social 
well-being of the nation. Today, Haiti is considered to be one of the poorest nations in the 
western hemisphere. With extreme poverty, an unstable economy, and a history of corrupt 
governments, Haiti remains in the context of a fragile state. While Haiti has had a long history of 
corrupt political leaders, the Duvalier regime, and The Jean-Bertrand Aristide presidency, are 
two very prominent cases of corruption within the Haitian government system pre-neoliberalism. 
The legacy of a lack of transparency and extortion during those eras have hindered the overall 
progression and future of development in the nation, particularly in the aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake. 
After the successful slave rebellion that established Haiti as the first independent Black 
nation, Haiti was internationally isolated from the rest of the world. On the foreign stage, 
countries refused to recognize Haiti as independent, and this undermined the very essence of the 
slave rebellion.15 Haiti had established a name for itself but at the same time became feared by 
                                                 
13 Ott, T. O. (1973). The Haitian Revolution, 1789-1804. Univ. of Tennessee Press. 
14 Nesbitt, F. N. T. (2008). Universal Emancipation: The Haitian Revolution and the Radical 
Enlightenment. University of Virginia Press. 
 
15Dunkel, G. (2003). US embargoes against Haïti, from 1806 to 2003 in Chin, P. et alii. Haiti, a slave 
revolution, 200 years after 1804. 
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other colonial powers. These colonial powers such as the Spanish and the English did not want 
what the Haitians had accomplished to influence their colonies. During that period of time, many 
of the worlds dominate powers still relied on slavery and the exploitation as a vital aspect of their 
economy. Acknowledging Haiti's independence meant that world powers would neglect their 
belief of the necessity of slavery, and that was not possible.  
 The recognition from France following the years of the Haitian independence is an 
important aspect in analyzing the state of Haiti today. After Haiti's independence, France did not 
recognize Haiti as an independent nation. Seventeen years after the Haitian independence, France 
offered Haiti self-rule under French surveillance.16 The Haitian opposed this idea, and rightfully 
so because they believe this to be a threat. This from an economic perspective was an attempt by 
the French colonial powers to maintain control over the former colony. France attempted to 
obtain the internal power of the new nation, while Haiti would be "self-ruled" France would still 
be making the overall decisions that affected the country as a whole. These decisions would 
continue to benefit France as the dominant power and further exploit Haiti. In exchange for 
international recognition, France demanded that Haiti pay 150 gold Francs ($21 Billion)—money 
that Haiti did not possess.17 This was to compensate the former slave owners for damages during 
the revolt. In order to pay off the debt, Haiti had to borrow 24 million francs to pay the first 
installment.18 Haiti was able to pay off the debt to France in 1947, 122 years after the 
“agreement” was established.19 
                                                 
16 Dubois, L. (2012). Haiti: The aftershocks of history. Metropolitan Books. 
 
17 Dunkel, G. (2003). US embargoes against Haïti, from 1806 to 2003 in Chin, P. et alii. Haiti, a slave 
revolution, 200 years after 1804. 
18 Ibid 
19 Ives, K. (2013). Haiti: Independence Debt, Reparations for Slavery and Colonialism, and International 
Aid. Global Research, 12. 
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  The root of Haiti's economic and social problem today can be traced back to the debt Haiti was 
forced to pay back to France during their "agreement". The weight placed upon repaying this 
debt left Haiti with little to no means of rebuilding and governing itself as a new nation. After 
paying off their debt, Haiti was left in an economically vulnerable state. Ultimately, economic 
instability lead to the political instability of the country, and increased the likelihood of 
government corruption. A government's job is to protect the rights of their people, as well as 
encourage the growth of their nation. It is very evident that the economic and social state of Haiti 
has worsened over the last 214 years. The country seems to be repeating a history of constant 
oppression, perpetuation of inequality, and corruption. The culprit of these injustices is no longer 
the French colonial power but, politicians voted into office by the people to eliminate the same 
inequalities they are perpetuating. The Duvalier regime from 1957-1968 and Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide are prominent cases of corruption in the country.20  
Under the Duvalier regime, the value of Haitian citizens and the overall growth of the 
country was not a priority. In order to understand exactly the severity of the effects in of 
Duvalier in Haiti, we must begin with Francois Papa Doc Duvalier. Francois Duvalier was 
elected into office in 1957. While in office Papa Doc declared himself president for life under the 
new constitution he had created.21 His constitution eliminated presidential elections and helped 
maintain his position in office. François Duvalier was a ruthless dictator who governed the 
nation of Haiti through terror tactics. One of Papa Doc’s main strategies of terror was his private 
militia the Tonton Makouts. The Tonton Makouts were created in 1959 and were responsible for 
systematic violence and human rights abuses that included, rape and murder to suppress political 
                                                 
20 Bellegarde-Smith, P. (2013). Dynastic dictatorship: The Duvalier years, 1957-1986. Haitian History: 
New Perspectives, 273-284. 
21 Nicholls, D. (1986). Haiti: The rise and fall of Duvalierism. Third World Quarterly, 8(4), 1239-1252. 
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opposition.22 To fund his militia, Papa Doc heavily taxed the citizens increasing poverty and 
inequality within the country. Corruption in the form of the misappropriation of funds, extortion, 
and domestic business like his administration of a tax agency, the Régie du Tabac (Tobacco 
Administration), for which no accounting records were kept also perpetuated inequality within 
the country.23 
Papa Doc as a dictator neglected the basic needs of the Haitian population and suppressed 
the people through fear, which was ironic as Papa Doc proclaimed himself a champion of Black 
nationalism. As a black nationalist, he promised to incorporate the Black population in the 
country that has historically been oppressed. However, Papa Doc did the complete opposite and 
ignored the impoverished rural Black population in his government expenditures. Under Papa 
Doc, the average annual income in Haiti was 75 Dollars, and 70% of the population was 
unemployed. 24Overall, the economy under Papa Doc was never allowed to prosper as Papa Doc 
was a paternalistic leader who focused on a political revolution that ravaged the country. 
As an example of corruption, Papa Doc misappropriated millions of US dollars of 
international aid, including $15 million USD annually from the US Government, transferring 
stolen funds to personal Swiss accounts. The U.S during the period of Papa Doc was particularly 
disturbed by the economic and social situation in Haiti. In response, international aid was cut 
from Haiti in mid-1962.25 However, to receive the return of economic assistance, the U.S. 
implemented stricter policies that monitored aid to Haiti which Duvalier refused. Duvalier then 
                                                 
22 ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 Grafton, R. Q., & Rowlands, D. (1996). Development impeding institutions: the political economy of 
Haiti. Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne d'études du développement, 17(2), 
261-277. 
25 Farmer, P., Fawzi, M. C. S., & Nevil, P. (2003). Unjust embargo of aid for Haiti. The Lancet, 361(9355), 
420-423. 
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publicly renounced all aid from The United States and damaged foreign relations. Trade relations 
no longer existed and the flow of income through the country’s economy was drastically 
reduced. 
After 14 years of dictatorship, Francois Duvalier died in 1971, leaving the country in 
economic ruins.26  However, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s death was not the end of the 
Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti.  In fact, since he declared himself president for life, his 19-year-
old son Jean Claude “Baby doc” succeed him as president. Baby Doc was a different kind of 
leader in the sense that he used fewer terror tactics and fear, but like his father, he still 
maintained the systemic corruption of inequality within the country that gave him power.  
When Jean-Claude Duvalier took office in 1971, he promised an economic revolution in 
Haiti, focused on tourism, and reviving foreign relations that his father had destroyed. The US 
government restored aid to Haiti in 1973, and the country enjoyed slight economic development. 
The reestablishment of foreign relations in Haiti allowed more production and revenue for the 
country. However, because corruption was so prominent in the Duvalier regime the little 
economic development that Haiti had seen in the 1980’s did not last long. Corruption continued 
to influence Duvalier’s policies, thus hindering the economic revolution he promised for the 
country. Duvalier’s promises of an economic revolution quickly gave into the inherent systemic 
corruption within the Haitian government. Although tourism was thriving, and foreign relations 
were restored, many of the revenues from these sources were going to Baby Doc’s private 
accounts rather than towards the development of the country.27 
As allegations of corruption continued against Duvalier so did support for his regime. At 
this particular time, the Haitian republic became hopeless as corruption continued to take over 
                                                 
26 ibid 
27 Nicholls, D. (1986). Haiti: The rise and fall of Duvalierism. Third World Quarterly, 8(4), 1239-1252. 
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the country. The growing attitudes against the capabilities of the existing government 
emphasized the disconnect between the government and its people. During the Duvalier regime 
(under both father and son) there was a lack of connection with the Haitian citizens. The 
government was more concerned with their own necessities, which negatively impacted people’s 
livelihoods. 
Political opposition increased in the country and in 1985 citizens of Haiti staged a coup 
d’état against Duvalier. The revolt began in the city of Gonaives and quickly spread through 
cities across the country until reaching the Capital Port-au-Prince. In response to the revolts 
against him, Jean-Claude responded with a 10% cut in staple food prices such as rice, and corn. 
He also responded by using the military to silence people through violence, and censorship of the 
media as a way to control the riots. Despite his efforts, the coup d’état against Jean-Claude 
continued. and caught the attention of the United States. On February 6th, 1986 Jean-Claude 
Duvalier left Haiti and sought political asylum in France and marked the end of the Duvalier 
regime.28The coup d’état against Duvalier, left Haiti in unstable conditions, a situation similar to 
the state of the country after the slave revolt. Although “Duvalierism” had ended in Haiti, 
fundamentally the system of corruption remained and continued under Jean- Bertrand Aristide. 
On February 7th, 1991 Jean-Bertrand Aristide took office as the first democratically 
elected president of Haiti.29 Aristide like many Haitian politicians campaigned on promises of 
hope and change for the country. A very charismatic leader, Aristide promised the disappearance 
of Duvalierism and the prominent corruption under their regime. Because many of his reforms 
were geared towards increasing economic stability, he was able to gain support from the poor 
                                                 
28 Bellegarde-Smith, P. (2013). Dynastic dictatorship: The Duvalier years, 1957-1986. Haitian History: 
New Perspectives, 273-284. 
 
29 Hallward, P. (2007). Damming the flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the politics of containment. Verso. 
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and working-class citizens of the country. Under this new leadership hope had been restored for 
the Haitian population, and in their eyes, Aristide marked a new beginning. Unfortunately, since 
the history of economic and political instability had never been resolved, it quickly resurfaced 
again.  
Approximately 6 months after Aristide was elected into office, he was ousted by a 
military coup formed by the Armed Forces of Haiti under Commander-In-chief Raoul Cédras. 
From October 1991 to September 1994 Haiti was governed by the military that had ousted 
Aristide. In the span of 5 years, the military regime was responsible for widespread human rights 
violations—an estimated 4,000 Haitians were killed.30 The military rule of Haiti reinforced the 
presence of systemic corruption within the country and exerted brutal force reminiscent of the 
terror tactics used under Francois Duvalier. Additionally, the military was only concerned with 
maintaining power as opposed to the overall economic and social progression of the country. 
During the coup, Aristide was sent into exile in Venezuela, but after the intervention of 
the United States he returned to Haiti and served as president from 1994 to 1996.31  When 
Aristide returned to Haiti it was clear that his promises for prosperity in the country had changed. 
He was no longer the same leader who advocated for economic and social reform policies in the 
country. At this point, Aristide fell into the cycle of corruption like many other leaders before 
him.  Following his return, Aristide governed Haiti under influences of external global forces. 
Most notably the International Monetary Fund influenced Aristides policies. While internally the 
people of Haiti were exploited by a system of corruption, externally Haiti was and still is 
exploited by global forces. 
                                                 
30 Haiti: 1991-1994: DEATH SQUADS AND STATE VIOLENCE UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME. (n.d.). 
Retrieved February 11, 2018, from http://cja.org/where-we-work/haiti/ 
31 ibid 
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Global external forces like the IMF perpetuated corruption under Aristide because as a 
failed state Haiti was highly dependent on international assistance. Surrendering to global forces 
Aristide implemented neoliberal policies that opened Haiti’s economy to the free market. This 
resulted in the continuation of economic instability that had plagued the nation throughout 
history. As corruption grew under Aristide's leadership, he became a very paternalistic leader 
who was concerned with pleasing external global forces. His promises of a new Haiti and 
equality quickly disappeared. Exploitation and corruption consumed the nation, and Haiti 
became the victim once again to its history. Aristide like political leaders before him left Haiti in 
an even more unstable economic and social conditions. Under Aristide efforts for democracy was 
undermined, and today the country continues to be heavily dependent on foreign assistance. 
Taking into context Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s presidency and the Duvalier regime, there is 
evidence of a history of corruption throughout these governments.  
The government of Haiti is systematically disorganized and the central issue seems to be 
internal and external exploitation. Internally the Haitian government continues to function on 
corruption, and externally political instability remains an obstacle in creating regulations for 
international NGOs. The counterproductive relationship between the Haitian government and 
NGOs is an important part of understanding the lack of progression post-earthquake. According 
to research conducting by The North American Congress on Latin America, Haiti has the largest 
NGOs per capita. Approximately 80% of the country’s basic services are provided by 
NGOs.32Following the earthquake, NGOs received the majority of the global relief funds, while 
the Haitian government, due to perceived corruption by the U.S. State Department, was 
                                                 
32 Edmonds, K. (2010, April 5). NGOs and the Business of Poverty in Haiti. Retrieved March 18, 2018, 
from https://nacla.org/news/ngos-and-business-poverty-haiti 
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marginalized in the recovery and rebuilding efforts. As a result, NGOs who are unaccountable to 
the Haitian people were left to make the majority of decisions. 
The unequal distribution of power between underdeveloped countries and developed 
countries is evident in the inner workings of international Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) such as the American Red Cross or Oxfam. NGOs function within the international aid 
system, and particularly their role in relation to other actors such as donors, civil society, and 
state governments capture the bigger picture in the context of Haiti. Additionally, NGOs are key 
actors in development and serve to tackle the "symptoms" of various issues such as poverty, 
gender equality, access to education, and disasters relief. NGOs attempt to work within the 
participatory development framework, while also catering to the needs of their donors. 
  Contrary to the bottom-up approach NGOs attempt to follow, there is also a top-down 
explanation of the emergence of nongovernmental organizations in the post-war period. Focusing 
on aspects related to political globalization, the funding and political access expanded in the 
post-war period provided a structured environment for the growth of NGOs. Secondly, there is a 
norm-based argument that describes the pro-NGO perspectives among donor states and 
intergovernmental organizations (NGOs) as a symbiotic relationship.33 NGOs progressed in the 
aftermath of the Cold war, and rapid globalization that brought the spread of market-liberalizing 
reforms across developing countries. Market liberalizing reforms include structural adjustment 
programs under neoliberal policies, which led to the increase of non-state actors such as, NGOs 
in development. In under-developing countries where there tends to be a lack of political and 
economic stability, we see the rise of NGOs in the role of the state. Haiti is an interesting case to 
                                                 
33 (Reimann, K. D. (2006). A view from the top: International politics, norms and the worldwide growth of 
NGOs. International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 45-67. 
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look at in this context, especially when analyzing the presence NGOs in the aftermath of the 
2010 earthquake.   
Donor Funds and Post-earthquake Haiti 
On January 12th, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit the island. Categorized as a 
"mega disaster" 22, 000 people were killed, 300,000 injured, and more than 2 million were 
forced from their homes.34 This natural disaster perpetuated the economic instability of Haiti and 
left many of the population in search of a better life in countries such as the U.S. The earthquake 
devastated the infrastructure of the country highlighting issues pertaining to social well-being, 
healthcare, and government emergency response. An already fragile state prior to the earthquake, 
Haiti suffered more instability when government agencies responsible for post-disaster response 
were victims themselves. The National Disaster management system, the Emergency Operations 
Center and Port-au-Prince’s main fire station—Direction de la Protection civil were severely 
damaged by the earthquake.35 As a result, the government was limited in their post-disaster 
response plans. However, the government managed to make important post-disaster steps to 
resume the city’s core functions by making fuel available, repairing two of the four damaged 
electric plants, reopening banks, and paying public sector workers.36 While these steps 
contributed to the country's post-disaster response, it was not merely enough to address the 
destruction of the earthquake.  
Since Haiti continued to struggle in maintaining political stability, they did not have the 
proper infrastructure to promote economic stability and progress in the midst of a natural 
disaster. As a result, government agencies who are supposed to serve the best interest of their 
                                                 
34 Gronewold, N. (2010). earthquake in Haiti Shattered Efforts to Restore Resources, Boost 
Agriculture. The New York Times, January 18. 
35 Patrick, J. (2011). Evaluation insights Haiti earthquake response emerging evaluation lessons. 
36 ibid 
 Brun 19 
citizen were unable to deliver adequate services. As a failed state, the Haitian government is 
unable to provide adequate support and good and services for their citizens. In comparison, the 
humanitarian response post-earthquake was much greater than the response from the Haitian 
government. There was an overwhelming international response to the situation in Haiti. 
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
in the first six months following the earthquake, 4 million people received food aid, 1.5 million 
people received emergency shelter materials, 11,000 latrines were built, and many more 
humanitarian responses occurred.37 However, the progress did not match up to the aid delivered.  
Many of the issues highlighted in post-disaster responses in Haiti related to the lack of 
coordination and regulation between humanitarian agencies and the Haitian government.  
The misappropriation of funds by NGOs is a central aspect in analyzing the role of 
international aid in Haiti. According to the Center for Global Development, an estimated three 
billion dollars in private donations and foreign aid were donated to NGOs after the 2010 
earthquake.38 However, there is a gap between the amount of money donated, the aid NGOs 
provided, and the services the Haitian people received. Most of the money donated went to 
NGOs or private contractors, while less than 1% percent of aid donated went to the Haitian 
government. Additionally, another important aspect in this context is the issue of trust between 
NGOs and unstable governments such as Haiti.39 As a failed state the perceived corruption 
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within the country’s government structures fueled the lack of trust NGOs had. This lack of trust 
enabled a situation in which NGOs accumulated decision making power that allowed them to 
navigate the country with little to no accountability and transparency.  
The set of relationships that emerged between the Haitian government and NGOs after 
the earthquake, shows what happens when underdeveloped countries experience shocks in the 
form of political instability and natural disasters. In the case of Haiti, the shock of a natural 
disaster emphasized the country's status as failed state and perpetuate their lack of good 
governance. More importantly, the infiltration of capitalist systems in the aftermath of these 
shocks led to the growth of disaster capitalism.  Haiti as a failed state where corruption thrives 
gives way for capitalist driven institutions to profit off of situations of displacement and poverty 
in the country. In many cases, NGOs were operating more as business working to profit off of 
the poverty, as opposed creating mitigation strategies for the instability of the country. 
NGOs also faced obstacles when seeking to innovate new intervention methods, their 
lack of focus on self-reliance and long-term sustainability, and their international funding. All 
these factors create setbacks for NGOs and the work they strive to do. NGOs also take part in 
creating a cycle of dependence, especially in the case where all public services are delivered by 
them. There is also the exclusion of Haitian citizens and professionals as a central problem for 
NGOs. NGO representatives admit that there is an unequal ratio of foreign employees to local 
employees.40 How do NGOs expect to work towards a long-term resolution for the Haitian 
people, if Haitian people are not included in the process?   
                                                 
40 Morton, B. (2013). An overview of international NGOs in development cooperation. United Nations 
Development Program. 
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The work of NGOs is necessary. However, the post-earthquake response in Haiti shows 
that corruption also exists within the NGO field. Additionally, the lack of NGO regulation by the 
Haitian government will only maintain the ineffective responses of NGOs. The negative effects 
of the lack of regulations for NGOs in Haiti is evident in the case of the American Red Cross. 
The organization had one of the most successful post-disaster fundraising efforts, receiving 
almost half a billion dollars. In their commitment to helping post-earthquake, the Red Cross 
vowed to help the Haitian people rebuild. However, after five years in the country, the 500 
million dollars raised did not match the services provided by the organization. The Red Cross 
claimed to have provided homes to more than 130,000 people, but the organization only built 6 
homes.41  In response to the suspicious allocation of funds, the Red Cross stated that “the needs 
of the country were great and like other aid groups, we faced difficult choices about where to 
best spend money as quickly and effectively as possible”.42 
The organization also stated that they did, in fact, build 6 homes, but it was part of a pilot 
project that ultimately did not meet the needs of the Haitian people. More specifically, the 
organization said, "As the project progressed, we learned a number of lessons that helped us 
revise our long-term shelter plans. The solutions we decided on ultimately helped more people 
that can be served through new construction efforts and could be implemented faster, helping 
people living in camps get back into safer homes and conditions sooner”. In efforts to be 
transparent in the midst of their inconsistent post-disaster relief, the organization reported that 
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they allocated $66 million to emergency relief, $173 million to shelter, $73 million to health, $47 
million to water and sanitation, $48 million to livelihoods, $56 million to disaster preparedness, 
and $25 million to cholera prevention.43  
Although the Red Cross eventually provided statistical evidence for the allocation of their 
funds, it is important to highlight that one of their main obstacles was a lack of knowledge on the 
existing conditions of Haiti prior to the earthquake. Through their reconstruction pilot project, 
the organization soon realized that the unequal land tenure system in Haiti would make it 
difficult to build homes as quickly as they promised. The lack of knowledge the Red Cross had 
on the existing conditions in Haiti, could have been avoided if a stronger relationship between 
the Haitian government and NGOs existed through a regulation system. A stronger relationship 
would allow for communication between NGOs and government officials in Haiti, and obstacles 
such as inconsistent tenure rights could be identified in disaster preparedness efforts. 
The type of exploitation and corruption exhibited by the American Red Cross increased 
the instability of the country and made no room for the Haitian government to build their 
capacity. More importantly, the presence of corruption within international aid institutions and 
government structures create spaces in which exploitation becomes inevitable. As exploitation of 
the Haitian government increases, so will their inability to regulate particular funding 
mechanisms. If the Haitian government decided to restrict the ways NGOs operate in their 
country, they would potentially risk their ability to receive aid entirely. However, having a 
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regulation system is essential in mitigating the unequal power dynamic that allows NGOs to 
abide by regulations they set for themselves 
Recommendations 
To address the existing corruption and the counterproductive relationship between the 
Haitian government and NGOs, the strategies necessary in pushing Haiti towards progression 
involves creating a strict regulation system for NGOs that enter the country. The monitoring 
system would hold both the Haitian government and international aid agencies responsible for 
the steps taken in post-disaster relief efforts. The NGO monitoring system includes an appointed 
commission responsible for the following: 
1. The registration and supervision of NGOs 
Under this regulation, NGOs would be required to register with the Haitian 
government through an application process.  
2. The coordination of NGO activities 
Once NGOs are registered to operate in the country, they would be responsible for 
reporting the evaluation data of their services to the Haitian government in addition to 
their home government. 
3. Providing advisory services for the NGOs  
The advisory services would help mitigate any obstacles NGOs come across when 
implementing specific post-disaster projects. The commission would assist with 
clarifying legal issues and providing alternative implementation options. 
Overall the case of Haiti post-earthquake is a difficult one to address. Haiti still remains one of 
the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere dependent on international aid. Although 
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international assistance to Haiti has aided the country, the Haitian government still needs to take 
responsibility for the country. The future of Haiti’s social and economic future is relying on new 
policies. Haiti’s existing assets are important when implementing new strategies. Additionally, 
post-disaster projects need to be geared towards ensuring economic prosperity for the country. 
The solution for the overall progression of the country returns to the government, in order for 
Haiti to change the government needs to change. As mentioned before the government needs to 
be held accountable for their actions. After all economic and social stability are all connected to 
political stability. Once the systemic corruption with the Haitian government is addressed, 
political stability as well as economic and social stability will follow. 
Recently, the Haitian government made important steps to regulate NGO operations in 
the country. In September 2017, The Haitian government announced banning the operations of 
257 NGOs in the country. The sanctions came after The Minister of Planning and External 
Cooperation (MPCE) discovered that many of these NGOs were disconnected from the priorities 
and needs of the Haitian people. Furthermore, The Minister of Planning and External 
Cooperation, Aviol Fleurant stated, “the administration intends to redefine a partnership with 
these international development institutions and agencies.” This decision is an example of 
stricter regulations that would ultimately address NGOs taking on the role of the state. 
Additionally, this decision, is the Haitian governments attempt to slowly remove Haiti from the 
state of welfare. By strengthening NGO regulations Haiti would be able to increase their capacity 
building efforts and take the necessary steps towards good governance. 
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